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“If President Lincoln’s [emancipation] proclamation was designed to end 
physical slavery, it would seem that the recent order of President Roosevelt 
[establishing the Fair Employment Practice Committee] is designed to end, or 
at least curb, economic slavery.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 1963, the bill that would eventually become the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 simmered in House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 5, a 
special body constructed to bypass hurdles which had doomed previous 
attempts to enact civil rights legislation.2 Meanwhile, on the streets of 
America, people took the fight over equality into their own hands. In May, 
Eugene “Bull” Connor turned fire hoses and attack dogs loose on peaceful 
protesters in Birmingham, Alabama. In August, more than 200,000 
demonstrators gathered for the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. 
The next month, a bomb exploded in a Birmingham church killing four little 
girls. In late November, the bill formally left the Subcommittee and was 
delivered to the House for a vote. Two days later, President John F. Kennedy 
was assassinated in Dallas, leaving President Johnson to oversee the eventual 
passage of the statute. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, is a statute born of a 
very specific historical moment. America in the 1950s and 1960s was a 
country in the throes of racial upheaval. Freedom rides; lunch counter sit-ins; 
the Montgomery bus boycott; the Little Rock 9; James Meredith’s admission 
to Ole Miss, accompanied by 25,000 federal troops; and the events of the 
summer of 1963 all set the stage for legislation guaranteeing freedom of 
dignity for African-Americans. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 emerged as the 
legislative answer to these calls for equality. Title VII of the Act, the key 
provision guaranteeing equality of opportunity in employment, was added by 
Subcommittee No. 5 during that tumultuous summer. The Civil Rights Act, 
including the employment equality provision, gave life to basic, fundamental 
principles upon which our Constitution and overall systems of laws are based 
and which the country demanded.  
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has been moving to categorize 
Title VII as a tort. In a series of cases decided between 2009 and 2013, the 
Court used tort principles to interpret anti-discrimination statutes and 
described them as federal torts.3 This characterization misunderstands the 
                                                                                                                     
 1 F.D.R.’s Executive Order, N.Y. AMSTERDAM STAR-NEWS, July 5, 1941, at 14. 
 2 See John G. Stewart, The Senate and Civil Rights, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964, at 149, 156–57, (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in the Civil Rights Struggle of 1963–1964, in THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, supra at 49, 56–58. 
 3 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013) 
(applying a but-for standard of causation to Title VII actions); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 
S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (referring to Title VII as a federal tort); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 
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fundamental nature of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act as a whole. Title VII 
is not a tort statute, designed to provide compensation for personal injury. Title 
VII is a statute that protects the right to own and use one’s own labor free from 
discrimination in order to provide meaningful economic opportunity and 
participation. This characterization of Title VII’s fundamental nature emerges 
from a study of the history of the Civil Rights Act, in general, and Title VII, in 
particular. It is also consistent with the treatment of employment 
discrimination in international law. 
This characterization of Title VII’s fundamental nature leads to several 
implications for the “tortification” debate. The most important implication 
relates to theories of statutory interpretation; it insists that Title VII be given a 
broad interpretation, rather than a narrow, textual interpretation, therefore, 
rejecting the tortification of Title VII. A robust reading of Title VII fits the 
historical context of Title VII as one element of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 
recognizes the importance of the constitutional norm codified by Title VII; and 
is consistent with the human rights approach to anti-discrimination law found 
in international law. In addition, understanding Title VII as a statute 
guaranteeing economic opportunity and participation suggests some 
interesting ideas for migration between tort law and Title VII. Specifically, the 
tort law concept of duty can establish a baseline requirement for Title VII that 
an employer create a workplace providing meaningful economic opportunities 
for all. 
Part II of this Article briefly describes the current debate over the 
tortification of Title VII and concludes that the main problems with 
tortification turn on theories of statutory interpretation, increasing the “intent” 
requirement and making “cause” more difficult to show. Part III of this Article 
establishes the fundamental nature of Title VII as a statute protecting 
economic opportunity and full participation using three different types of 
analyses. The “elements approach” places Title VII in context and argues that 
it cannot be interpreted in isolation because it is only one element of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. The “super-statute approach” argues that Title VII 
embodies the fundamental principle, originally found in the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that individuals have the right to own 
and use their own labor free of discrimination, in order to have meaningful 
economic opportunity. The “human rights approach” shows that international 
law also categorizes and interprets employment nondiscrimination provisions 
in this way. Part IV of this Article discusses the implications of Title VII’s 
fundamental nature to the debate over the migration and conflict between torts 
and civil rights law. 
                                                                                                                     
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (maintaining employer’s discrimination must be the but-for 
cause of the adverse action). 
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II. THE TORTIFICATION DEBATE 
During the last five years, the United States Supreme Court has ignited a 
debate about the extent to which Title VII should be treated as a tort for 
purposes of judicial interpretation. The Court has done this in a trio of cases: 
Gross (a 2009 Age Discrimination in Employment Act case);4 Staub (a 2011 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act case);5 and 
Nassar (a 2013 Title VII retaliation case).6 The so-called tortification of Title 
VII presents two major doctrinal issues: a shift in how intent must be proved 
and changes in the way that causation is understood. These have been 
accompanied by a move to a very textualized interpretation of the statute. Each 
of these cases has in effect narrowed the scope of Title VII protection without 
explicitly stating that Title VII was or should be contracted. Instead, the 
Supreme Court has focused on the need to use tort doctrine to interpret Title 
VII, with the natural result being that cases are harder for plaintiffs to prove 
and win.  
Title VII’s original prohibition against employment discrimination reads: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.7 
Significantly, the statute has never defined what it means “to 
discriminate . . . because of” a person’s membership in a protected category.8 
In the early days of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Griggs v. Duke Power, in which it judicially created the doctrine of disparate 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Gross, 557 U.S. 167. 
 5 Staub, 131 S. Ct. 1186. 
 6 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517. 
 7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)). 
 8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). But cf. 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2012)) (defining “because of sex” for the protected 
category of sex to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy).  
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impact as a way of proving discrimination.9 This doctrine prohibits practices 
that are neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, if they have a 
discriminatory impact on a protected class and are not job related.10 The 
Supreme Court justified this doctrine by arguing “the objective of Congress in 
the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to 
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.”11 The early Supreme Court took a broad view of the 
purpose of Title VII and its language; it did not make an attempt to parse the 
text. Instead, it looked at the purpose of the legislation, finding it was meant to 
proscribe “not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, 
but discriminatory in operation.”12 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied 
on Gaston County v. United States, a voting rights case that struck down the 
institution of literacy tests for voter registration on the ground that the test 
would abridge the right to vote indirectly on the account of race, due to the 
history of inferior schooling available to African-Americans.13 The creation of 
the disparate impact doctrine in employment discrimination embodied an 
approach to understanding discrimination that had a significant impact on civil 
rights jurisprudence.14 
In the trio of tortification cases, Professor Sandra Sperino argues that the 
Court has embraced a “new textualist philosophy,” in which the Court will 
look to the words of a statute, rather than its legislative history, in determining 
how to interpret the statute.15 She demonstrates, in Gross and Nassar, that 
when the Court must determine how to define “because of,” “the Court adds a 
new textualist canon to discrimination jurisprudence—unless Congress directs 
otherwise, the default meaning of words is a tort meaning.”16 Professor 
Sperino argues that Gross is strongly textual because it relies on the plain 
meaning of “because of” to equate that phrase with the tort doctrine of “but-
                                                                                                                     
 9 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–33 (1971) (“If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited”). 
 10 In 1991, Congress codified disparate impact as a form of discrimination and 
amended Title VII to define the burden of proof in disparate impact cases. Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)). 
 11 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30. 
 12 Id. at 431. 
 13 Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 287, 297 (1969). 
 14 See generally Robert Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of 
Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 225 (1976) 
(examining the disparate impact doctrine which created a new avenue for bringing claims 
under Title VII). 
 15 See Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1107, 1116–20 (2014) [hereinafter Sperino, Let’s Pretend]. 
 16 Id. at 1119–20. 
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for” causation.17 In Nassar, Professor Sperino asserts the Court equates 
“because of” with “but for” and does so because of a narrow, textual, and tort-
based reasoning.18 In reaching these conclusions, the Court did not look at the 
purpose of Title VII; it relied on two non-employment discrimination cases, 
multiple restatements of torts, dictionaries, and tort treatises to reach its 
decision.19 In Staub, the Court makes this move explicit, stating: “We start 
from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the 
background of general tort law.”20 Professor Sperino notes a similar move to 
the use of textualist arguments when the Court imports a requirement of 
proximate cause into discrimination statutes.21 She concludes, “[t]hus, the 
story of the tort label is entwined with the rise of textualism,” and “the Justices 
can use tort law to find a specific meaning to particular statutory words or 
ideas.”22 This textualist approach causes problems for plaintiffs in the 
doctrinal areas of intent and causation under Title VII because the cases are 
harder to prove and win. 
A. Intent 
In Staub, the Supreme Court dealt with the proof of intent in a “cat’s paw” 
case in which an allegedly discriminatory act of a subordinate ends up 
affecting the employee through the actions of a supervisor who is relying on 
the subordinate’s action (usually a performance review) to make an 
employment decision. The case was brought as a disparate treatment case in 
which the plaintiff alleged intentional discrimination (as opposed to a disparate 
impact type case described above).23 In most previous disparate treatment 
cases, the Court focused only on the motive or animus of the defendant; 
however, Professor Charles Sullivan has argued that the Court added to the 
plaintiff’s burden in this case by also requiring the plaintiff to establish intent 
in the same way that a tort plaintiff establishes intent in an intentional tort 
case.24 Under tort law, a plaintiff proves intent either by showing the 
defendant desired that his action would cause the consequences of his act or he 
acted with the knowledge or belief that the consequences were substantially 
                                                                                                                     
 17 See id. at 1114–15, 1119–21. 
 18 See id. at 1120. 
 19 See Univ. of Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013); Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009). 
 20 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011). 
 21 See Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199, 
1217–20, 1229–30 (2013) [hereinafter Sperino, Statutory]; Sandra F. Sperino, 
Discrimination Statutes, The Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 
20, 27, 31 [hereinafter Sperino, Discrimination]. 
 22 Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1066–67 (2014) 
[hereinafter Sperino, Tort]. 
 23 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1189. 
 24 See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1431, 1439–41 (2012). 
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certain to result from it.25 Tortifying intent under Title VII means that a 
plaintiff now must show both motive (motive to treat an employee differently 
because of his race, etc.) and intent (the defendant either wants different 
treatment to result or acts with knowledge or belief that it is substantially 
certain to result).26 
Professor Sperino criticizes the Court’s approach, arguing that “because 
of” refers to causation, not intent, so plaintiffs should be able to proceed 
without proving tort-type intent for Title VII or other equal employment 
statutes.27 She also argues, using a variety of tort examples, that if tort-based 
intent is the proper doctrine to use in Title VII then intent in disparate 
treatment cases can now be proved without showing animus or motive—an 
easier standard than traditionally required under Title VII jurisprudence.28 
B. Causation 
In the tortification cases, the Supreme Court has also turned to tort 
principles of causation in interpreting the phrase “because of.” The Court has 
done this by incorporating the notion of “but-for” causation into employment 
discrimination jurisprudence and by adding the torts requirement of proximate 
cause. These are new moves because, as described above, courts had 
traditionally focused on either animus (for disparate treatment cases) or effects 
(for disparate impact cases). The cases signal a shift away from employment 
discrimination jurisprudence and towards tort jurisprudence. 
In Gross, the Supreme Court stated that for cases arising under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), “because of” means “but for.”29 
In other words, a plaintiff must prove that, if the plaintiff was not a member of 
the protected class, the defendant would not have taken the adverse 
employment action.30 This approach contrasts with the ability of Title VII 
plaintiffs, established in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to prove so-called 
mixed-motive cases in which a plaintiff may prevail by showing that the 
protected category was a motivating factor for the discrimination even if other 
reasons for the adverse employment action existed.31 The Court reasoned that 
Congress could have specified that the mixed-motive standard found in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies to the ADEA, as well as Title VII, but it did 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See id. at 1453–55. 
 26 See id. 
 27 See Sperino, Let’s Pretend, supra note 15, at 1121–22. 
 28 Id. at 18–19. 
 29 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
 30 Id. 
 31 In mixed-motive cases, once a plaintiff has shown that the protected characteristic 
was a motivating factor, the defendant can still limit the remedies available to the plaintiff 
by showing that it would have taken the same action even in absence of the protected 
characteristic. See Sperino, Tort, supra note 22, at 1060, 1071. 
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not.32 The Court then turned to tort law, instead of employment discrimination 
law, to determine the meaning of “because of.”33 
In Nassar, a Title VII retaliation case, the Court also said that a plaintiff 
must establish “but-for” cause.34 As Professor Sperino shows, the Court used 
“textbook tort law” to require “but-for” cause in proving “because of.”35 This 
shift is problematic because it relies on tort law, instead of established 
discrimination law, to define cause. Professor Sperino also argues that, even 
from a torts perspective, it is problematic because it ignores other possible 
ways of showing cause-in-fact under tort law, such as a substantial factor.36 
In Staub (the cat’s paw case), the Court furthered the tortification of 
causation in discrimination cases by importing the tort notion of proximate 
cause into employment discrimination laws.37 In tort law, a plaintiff must 
prove both cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Proximate cause is defined as 
the subset of cases for which there is cause-in-fact and the Court believes it is 
fair to hold the defendant liable.38 The purpose of the proximate cause 
requirement is to provide a double-check of fairness within the tort system. In 
Staub, the Court said that the use of subordinate intent is necessary but not 
sufficient.39 The supervisor must also have intent because the discriminatory 
performance evaluation is not an adverse employment action.40 The Court 
characterizes the intent requirement as a proximate cause requirement, similar 
to the requirement found in tort law, apparently because it would not be fair to 
hold the employer responsible.41 Professor Sperino criticizes this move 
because proximate cause does not “fit” Title VII cases because the 
employment discrimination statutory framework already balances the fairness 
objectives of proximate cause through specific statutory requirements.42 
Professor Sullivan suggests that the proximate cause requirement has been 
incorporated by the Supreme Court to prevent the use of “cognitive bias” 
evidence in discrimination cases.43 Regardless of the reason behind the 
                                                                                                                     
 32 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177. 
 33 See id. at 177–78. 
 34 Univ. of Tex. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). 
 35 See Sperino, Tort, supra note 22, at 1066. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192 (2011). 
 38 David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 
1681–82 (2007). 
 39 Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194. 
 40 See Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1440–41. 
 41 Id. at 1457–58. 
 42 Sperino, Discrimination, supra note 21, at 6, 51–54; see also Sperino, Tort, supra 
note 22, at 1074–75. 
 43 Sullivan, supra note 24, at 1478 (“One exercise of practical politics [of proximate 
cause] might be for the Supreme Court to hold that a showing that cognitive bias caused an 
adverse employment action in fact does not suffice for liability. Rather, a plaintiff must 
show that the employer consciously factored a prohibited consideration into the decision in 
question.”). 
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Court’s shift, the addition of proximate cause clearly adds a new, tort-based 
requirement to the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court mischaracterizes the nature of Title VII when it uses 
tort principles to interpret it and limit its reach. Title VII is properly 
understood as a statute that guarantees the right of individuals to use their own 
labor to have meaningful economic opportunity. Three different analytical 
frameworks support this understanding of Title VII’s fundamental nature: the 
elements approach argues that Title VII cannot be interpreted independently of 
the rest of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the super-statute approach argues that 
Title VII rests on the constitutional principle found in the Thirteenth 
Amendment that each individual has the right to use his or her labor in order to 
have meaningful economic opportunity; and the human rights approach looks 
to international law to show that discrimination in employment is a violation 
of human rights because it discriminatorily denies meaningful economic 
opportunity. 
A. The Elements Approach 
When the Supreme Court approaches Title VII as a tort and uses tort 
principles to define its language, the Court fails to recognize that Title VII 
cannot be fully understood in isolation. It is only one part of the overall civil 
rights landscape. The prohibition against discrimination in employment is only 
one of the elements in a larger guarantee of equality in society found in the 
civil rights statutes.  
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it addressed a broad 
spectrum of discrimination and tried to guarantee equality in society by 
regulating most aspects of civil society. Title I of the Civil Rights Act 
addressed voting. Title II, the most controversial provision at the time, 
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations. Title III tackled 
discrimination in public facilities. Title IV and Title IX addressed 
discrimination in public education. Title VI addressed programs receiving 
federal money and, finally, Title VII prohibited discrimination in employment.  
Nor was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 the only anti-discrimination statute 
passed during that time. In 1965, the Voting Rights Act created a 
comprehensive framework to ensure that African-Americans and others were 
not disenfranchised due to their race. Three years later, Congress passed the 
Housing Rights Act, also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1968, to prohibit 
discrimination in the sale, rental or financing of housing. 
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This series of civil rights laws, taken together, are sometimes referred to as 
“the second reconstruction.”44 Scholars argue that the 1950s and 1960s 
witnessed massive changes in society and laws that essentially rewrote or 
redefined the Constitution to better guarantee equality for African-Americans 
and other minorities.45 Freedom rides and sit-ins, organized by the Congress 
on Racial Equality (CORE), began to take place in 1947 and were in full force 
by the 1960s. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. 
Board Of Education in 1954, ordering schools nationwide to desegregate. In 
1957, the nation witnessed the Little Rock Nine integrate Arkansas schools. 
Five years later, 25,000 federal troops deployed to Oxford, Mississippi to 
protect James Meredith as he became the first African-American to attend the 
University of Mississippi.  
The summer of 1963 saw a series of events that provided the back drop to 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In May, Bull Connor turned fire 
hoses and let attack dogs loose on peaceful protesters. Video and photographs 
of these events greatly affected the population at large and its views on 
whether the government needed to act to better ensure equality. In August, the 
March on Washington took place, highlighted by Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I 
Have a Dream” speech. Again, the public perception of the need for civil 
rights legislation, as well as politicians’ awareness of the growing strength of 
the civil rights movement, created the opportunity for the Civil Rights Act to 
go forward. In mid-September, a Birmingham Church was bombed, killing 
four innocent, little African-American girls and further turning people in favor 
of governmentally-guaranteed equality. Finally, in November, the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy provided President Johnson with 
the support of the country to finish the work started by the late President.  
The purpose of this very brief history lesson is to show that Title VII can 
only be truly understood and correctly interpreted when it is read in 
conjunction with the surrounding events, both socially and legislatively. The 
prohibition against discrimination in employment is only one element of a 
larger program to provide equality and full participation of African-Americans 
in all aspects of society. This larger guarantee, this larger purpose, needs to 
provide the backdrop for interpretation of Title VII. 
                                                                                                                     
 44 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
127–225 (2014); U.S. House of Representatives, The Civil Rights Movement and the 
Second Reconstruction, 1945–1968, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/ 
Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Civil-Rights-
Movement/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FV8N-RWPL. 
 45 For a description and critique of “constitutional moment” analysis, see WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 61–65 (2010) [hereinafter 
ESKRIDGE, REPUBLIC]; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1272 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Super] (critiquing Ackerman’s 
description of the “second reconstruction” constitutional moment). 
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B. The Super-Statute Approach 
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn established the concept of a “super-
statute” to explain why all statutes are not created equal and why some must 
be given preeminence over others.46 In their seminal article, they argue that 
“super-statutes occupy the legal terrain once called ‘fundamental law,’ 
foundational principles against which people presume their obligations and 
rights are set, and through which interpreters apply ordinary law.”47 In 
addition to addressing fundamental or foundational ideas, a super-statute: 
(1) [S]eeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework 
for state policy and 
(2) [O]ver time does ‘stick’ in the public culture such that 
(3) [T]he super-statute and its institutional or normative principles 
have a broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the 
four corners of the statute. 
Super-statutes are typically enacted only after lengthy normative debate 
about a vexing social or economic problem . . . . The law must also prove 
robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time, such that its earlier 
critics are discredited and its policy and principles become axiomatic for the 
public culture.48 
In practice, super-statutes are construed liberally and purposively.49 Ordinary 
rules of construction may not be applied.50 When there are conflicts with other 
statutes, the super-statute will trump an ordinary statute and the ordinary 
statute will be read or evaluated in light of the super-statute.51 
Eskridge and Ferejohn developed the super-statute theory as a way to 
understand why courts treat certain statutes differently from others and to 
explain the outcome of certain cases that seem incorrect when subject to 
ordinary canons of statutory construction. In this way, it is primarily a 
descriptive theory. They identify a variety of statutes as super-statutes and 
suggest the foundational principles on which those statutes are based. They 
identify the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title VII in particular, as a super-
statute based on the foundational principle of nondiscrimination.52 Eskridge 
and Ferejohn also suggest the normative view that super-statutes should be 
viewed as quasi-constitutional law deserving of greater deference.53 Further, 
                                                                                                                     
 46 See Eskridge, Super, supra note 45, at 1215–17 (defining super statutes and noting 
their effect on courts’ interpretation of the law). 
 47 Id. at 1216.  
 48 Id. (numerical formatting added).  
 49 Id. at 1222. 
 50 Id. at 1216. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Eskridge, Super, supra note 45, at 1237. 
 53 Id. at 1271. 
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super-statutes can be used to create positive rights flowing from constitutional 
guarantees.54 
The super-statute framework is most persuasive and useful when a specific 
statute can be traced to a constitutional principle. Thus, the analysis provided 
by Eskridge and Ferejohn can be built upon usefully by focusing on Title VII 
specifically and by identifying a fundamental principle different than 
nondiscrimination. A thorough understanding of the history of Title VII 
suggests that Title VII is a super-statute based upon the fundamental principle 
that each individual has the right to use his or her labor in order to have 
meaningful economic opportunity. This fundamental principle has its roots in 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that 
“[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United 
States.”55 The connection between Title VII and the Thirteenth Amendment, 
as a class-based tool of empowerment, begins with the legislative history of 
Title VII and proceeds backwards in time, through the New Deal, to show its 
connection to the Thirteenth Amendment. 
1. Title VII 
Much has been written about the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. To a large extent, that story focuses on the strategy needed to 
overcome legislative rules that prevented a civil rights bill from getting out of 
a drafting committee and to overcome a filibuster waged by conservative 
forces. Less attention has been focused on the more specific legislative history 
of Title VII, especially its origins. An examination of the legislative history of 
Title VII shows that its substantive provisions and structure reflect the 
fundamental principle of equality of economic opportunity, which had been 
developing for almost a century in the United States. 
The version of the Civil Rights Act circulating in early 1963 did not 
include a prohibition against discrimination in employment. It only addressed 
discrimination in public accommodation, voting, and education. The 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (Leadership Conference), an 
influential group of fifty labor and religious organizations, and especially its 
members from the labor movement, lobbied hard for the inclusion of a Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) in the bill.56 The Kennedy 
Administration was reluctant to include FEPC (or broad accommodation 
protection) in the Civil Rights Act because it feared that such a bill would not 
get enough Republican support to overcome a filibuster.57 By mid-June, the 
FEPC was still not in the bill, but Vice President Johnson indicated some 
                                                                                                                     
 54 See ESKRIDGE, REPUBLIC, supra note 45, at 46 (discussing President Roosevelt’s 
New Deal programs). 
 55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 56 See Rauh, supra note 2, at 52–60. 
 57 Id. at 54. 
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flexibility on its inclusion if public support was mobilized in its favor.58 
Walter Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers, and others worked 
towards mobilizing that support.  
Meanwhile, the bill was sent to House Judiciary Subcommittee No. 5, a 
specially created subcommittee chaired by Representative Emanuel Celler, 
designed to circumvent the existing committee rules which had previously 
prevented a civil rights bill from getting through the congressional committee 
structure. Hearings on the bill continued throughout the summer, and Peter 
Rodino agreed to offer an FEPC amendment in Subcommittee No. 5, but the 
amendment he put forward was a fairly weak provision dealing only with 
government contracts and relying on persuasion not legal suits to enforce the 
equality guarantee.59 In August, 200,000 demonstrators attended the March on 
Washington, giving the legislation new inspiration. On September 25, 1963, 
Pete Rodino offered a retooled Title VII, establishing the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and providing for private lawsuits.60 
According to John G. Stewart, the top legislative assistant to Senator Hubert 
Humphrey during passage of Civil Rights Act, it was the influence of the 
Leadership Conference on Subcommittee No. 5 that led to the inclusion of the 
EEOC.61 The AFL-CIO played a key role in particular because it refused to 
support the bill unless it had strong equal employment opportunity 
provisions.62 
In late September, the Subcommittee reported a strong bill out to the full 
judiciary committee, in defiance of the wishes of the Administration. In late 
October, the full Judiciary Committee and President Kennedy put together a 
compromise bill, but one which still included the fair employment provisions. 
In late November, the bill moved to the House floor with no assurance that it 
would pass. Then, on November 22, President Kennedy was assassinated. Vice 
president Johnson pushed the bill forward to its eventual passage. 
As this legislative history shows, Title VII emerged from the idea of the 
FEPC and was championed by a coalition of civil rights leaders, including 
labor leaders, in the judiciary subcommittee. The FEPC and the Leadership 
Conference, in turn, have their origin in the FEPC established by President 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1941, as explored in the next section. Title VII and its 
predecessor, the FEPC, reflect the fundamental principle of equality of 
economic opportunity. 
                                                                                                                     
 58 Id. at 54–55. 
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2. Title VII and Roosevelt’s Fair Employment Practices Committee 
Between 1941 and 1945, the United States federal government had the 
FEPC dedicated to providing equal employment opportunity for African-
Americans and others in federal employment.63 This little known agency 
provided the substantive framework, the activist leadership, and the 
philosophical principles for what would eventually become Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. An analysis of the origins of the FEPC, its 
substantive operations, the principles on which it was based, and its legacy 
show that Title VII had its basis in the fundamental principle that each 
individual has the right to use his or her labor in order to have meaningful 
economic opportunity. 
a. Origins of the FEPC 
During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the United States economy grew as 
a result of job creation spurred by World War II.64 African-Americans, 
unfortunately, did not share in the benefits of the recovery. In fact, nonwhite 
job placements actually fell from 5.4% in 1940 to 2.5% in 1941.65 Many 
industries and most American Federation of Labor (AFL) craft-based unions 
were closed to African-Americans.66 In northern cities, the African-American 
unemployment rate ranged between forty and fifty percent and nationwide 
eighty-seven percent of this population lived below the poverty line.67 In order 
to address this problem, in 1940, African-American groups, led by A. Philip 
Randolph, founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), and 
others, started organizing protest meetings and began to publicly demand 
equality in America’s defense industries.68 
Intense lobbying continued into 1941, resulting in the introduction of a 
congressional bill in March that would create a commission to investigate and 
prohibit discrimination.69 The Office of Production Management, which 
oversaw government contracts with defense industries, sent a nonbinding letter 
                                                                                                                     
 63 About eighty percent of the FEPC’s work focused on Black Americans, but they 
also dealt with discrimination against Mexican-Americans, Japanese-Americans, Jews and 
Seventh Day Adventists. See MERL E. REED, SEEDTIME FOR THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT: THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE, 1941–1946, 
at 231–66 (1991). 
 64 See id. at 13. 
 65 LOUIS RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS, & POLITICS 12 (1953). 
 66 Id. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), on the other hand, organized 
entire industries and welcomed African-American members. See id. at 10. 
 67 ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1941–1972, at 35 (2009). Twice as many African-Americans lived in 
poverty as white Americans. 
 68 See RUCHAMES, supra note 65, at 9. 
 69 Id. at 15. 
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to defense contractors urging them to eliminate discriminatory bans.70 African-
American leaders found these efforts disingenuous and inadequate, and 
Randolph began to organize a “March-on-Washington Committee,” planning 
to bring 50,000–100,000 African-Americans to the nation’s capital on July 1, 
1941.71 Fearing the effect of such a demonstration on America’s reputation 
during wartime, first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, New York City Mayor Fiorello 
La Guardia, and others met with Randolph to try to persuade him to cancel the 
march. Randolph refused and even suggested that a preliminary march would 
occur in New York City on June 27, 1941.72 President Roosevelt finally 
agreed to a personal meeting with Randolph, in which he promised the 
appointment of a committee including the Secretary of War and Secretary of 
the Navy to resolve the problem.73 Randolph remained dissatisfied and 
promised that “the March will go on.”74 President Roosevelt relented. On June 
24, 1941, a draft executive order was circulated to Randolph and Walter White 
of the NAACP. Following brief negotiations, a revised draft was approved and 
on June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802, which 
banned discrimination in government and defense industries.75 The National 
Negro Congress called the Executive Order “‘a great step forward’ in the 
Negro people’s struggle for a ‘complete democracy.’”76 Randolph reportedly 
described it as “the most significant document since the Emancipation 
Proclamation.”77 Echoing the sentiment, the Negro Handbook called it “the 
most significant move on the part of the Government since the Emancipation 
Proclamation . . . .”78 
b. Substance and Operation of the FEPC 
Located in the Office of Production Management, the FEPC began 
operation on July 18, 1941. President Roosevelt appointed a six person 
committee, including the two leaders of the AFL and the Congress of 
Industrial Organization (CIO); an African-American lawyer and alderman in 
Chicago; the chairman of the executive board of the BSCP; a leading 
industrialist of Jewish descent; and a liberal, southern newspaper publisher 
who had been active in anti-lynching and poll tax issues.79 To address 
discrimination within the government, Roosevelt sent a letter to all heads of 
federal departments and agencies forbidding discrimination on the basis of 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 17. 
 72 Id. at 18. 
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 75 Id. at 20–22.  
 76 Id. at 23. 
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race, religion, or national origin.80 To address discrimination in private 
employment, the FEPC decided to hold hearings in each major geographic 
region of the country during its first year of existence to determine the scope 
of discrimination.81 These hearings also addressed discrimination within 
particular sectors, and the FEPC responded to discrimination by issuing 
directives to individual employers and trade unions.82 During this time period, 
the FEPC was able to “stage several high-profile hearings, adjust thousands of 
individual complaints of discrimination, and establish an unparalleled 
infrastructure within the federal bureaucracy for addressing discrimination . . . 
.”83  
The FEPC ran into political trouble in its second year of operation, 
especially when it began to hold hearings in the South.84 In July 1942, the 
FEPC was transferred to the War Manpower Commission (WMC), as a way to 
restrict its activities.85 In January, 1943, Paul McNutt, the person in charge of 
the FEPC within the WMC, suspended planned hearings about discrimination 
in the railroad industry.86 The FEPC fell into a state of “suspended animation,” 
unable to perform its duties because of political opposition, lack of financial 
support, and a series of resignations.87 This stalemate continued until May 27, 
1943, when Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9346 establishing what has 
come to be called the “second FEPC.”88 
Executive Order 9346 established a new FEPC as an independent agency 
reporting solely to the President.89 During the period between May 1943 and 
Roosevelt’s death in 1945, the FEPC did some of its best work, although the 
results were far from perfect. In Alabama ship yards, for example, the FEPC 
ordered promotions for twelve African-Americans into welder positions 
previously unavailable to them because of their race. The order resulted in a 
small riot and the deployment of Army soldiers. Further negotiations led to an 
agreement that included the establishment of segregated shipways where 
African-Americans could be promoted into skilled trade jobs, from which they 
had previously been barred.90 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Id. at 26. 
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Progress in the railroad industry was particularly difficult, but the FEPC 
did eventually issue an order directing all railroads to “‘cease and desist’ from 
‘discriminatory practices affecting the employment of Negroes.’”91 In an 
advertisement in the New York Times and other major newspapers, the BSCP 
said the directive “has done more to restore the belief of Negro Americans in 
the genuineness of their country’s democratic faith and aspiration than 
anything that has happened since the President issued his original anti-
discrimination order in June, 1941.”92 Unfortunately, implementation of the 
directive ran into political criticism and industry opposition, and it was never 
fully realized.93 At the same time, the NAACP under the leadership of Charles 
Hamilton Houston was litigating Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 
challenging the refusal of white railroad firemen unions to represent black 
railroad firemen in a nondiscriminatory way.94 Houston pursued cases before 
both the FEPC and in the federal courts, recognizing that the two routes could 
be used to strengthen each other.95 When the plaintiffs prevailed in Steele, 
Houston saw the victory as a vindication for the work of the FEPC and 
justification for the creation of a permanent FEPC.96 
The FEPC was also able to settle a variety of transit worker cases,97 and 
play a role in the integration of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 
Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers (IBB) on the West Coast.98 The settlement in 
these industries illustrated how the issues confronted by the FEPC were not 
just about race but were also very much about class and labor relations. In the 
transit worker cases (arising in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia), the 
resistance to equal employment opportunity did not correlate with racism or 
public opinion.99 Instead, it turned upon the prevailing labor-management 
relations and whether “[u]nion officials approved of the move and were secure 
enough to squelch the few verbal objections offered by white workers.”100 In 
the case of the West Coast IBB the FEPC by itself was ineffective in moving 
the AFL Union away from its discriminatory “auxiliary union” system for 
African-Americans or swaying recalcitrant employers and shipbuilders, such 
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as Kaiser.101 The AFL and employers simply ignored its orders.102 The 
situation only changed when a coalition including the Urban League in 
Portland, the NAACP in San Francisco, and the CIO in Los Angeles 
challenged the discriminatory union practices in court and won.103 
In James v. Marinship Corp.,104 the Supreme Court of California ruled 
that neither a union nor an employer enforcing a union contract could both 
arbitrarily exclude African-Americans from membership and maintain a closed 
shop agreement (requiring union membership for employment) because that 
combination was contrary to the public policy of California.105 The Supreme 
Court of California stated the union’s “asserted right to choose its own 
members does not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental 
right to work for a living.”106 The court stated that public policy prohibited 
discrimination based on race and stated further: 
In addition to these persuasive analogies, we have an express statement of 
national policy in Executive Order No. 9346 of the President of the United 
States, issued on May 27, 1943. This order declares that it is the policy of the 
United States to encourage full participation in the war effort of all persons 
regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, that there should be no 
discrimination in the employment of any person in war industries because of 
such, and that it is the duty of all employers and all labor organizations to 
eliminate discrimination in regard to terms and conditions of employment or 
union membership because of race, creed, color, or national origin.107 
The FEPC hearings and publicity no doubt influenced the outcome of the 
lawsuit, and the outcome of the lawsuit “forced the boilermakers for the first 
time to begin negotiating in earnest with the FEPC.”108 
President Roosevelt’s death in April, 1945, coupled with the winding 
down of the war, led to the eventual demise of the FEPC.109 Supporters found 
it difficult to convince Congress to authorize appropriations for the agency.110 
President Truman did not support the FEPC, refusing to let the FEPC issue a 
directive regarding the D.C. transit agency and decreasing the FEPC’s 
funding.111 In December 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order 
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9664, which limited the power of the agency to fact-finding and prohibited the 
issuance of cease and desist orders.112 On June 28, 1946, the FEPC issued its 
final report.113 In 1946, Congress formally abolished the FEPC. Although the 
House of Representatives voted to create a new FEPC in 1946, the bill was 
rejected in the Senate.114  
c. The Principles Underlying the FEPC 
The importance of the FEPC goes beyond the modest results described 
above. Why else would A. Philip Randolph have compared Executive Order 
8802 to the Emancipation Proclamation?115 The reason lies in the fundamental 
nature of the principles underlying the FEPC. As the Amsterdam News 
editorial proclaimed in 1941: “If President Lincoln’s proclamation was 
designed to end physical slavery, it would seem that the recent order of 
President Roosevelt is designed to end or at least curb, economic slavery.”116 
The FEPC gave life to the fundamental principle that individuals have the right 
to own and use their own labor, free of discrimination, in order to have 
meaningful economic opportunity. 
A contemporary Washington Post editorial arguing in favor of FEPC 
legislation argued that there is “nothing more fundamental to a democratic 
society than equality of economic opportunity . . . .”117 Public opinion polls 
from the time show that people favored the legislation because “[a]ll men [are] 
created equal” and that “equal opportunity is ‘one of [the] basic precepts of our 
democracy.’”118 Support for legislation was highest when the legislation was 
described as protecting a qualified person from being denied a job because of 
their race, religion, color, or nationality.119 These highlight the importance of 
meaningful economic opportunity as the principle underlying the FEPC 
legislation efforts, rather than an amorphous idea of racial equality. 
Randolph described the purpose of FEPC legislation not as the elimination 
of bias or racial prejudice, but as the elimination of discrimination. He focused 
not on changing attitudes but on changing discriminatory acts and their effects. 
In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, responding to their anti-FEPC 
editorial, he wrote: 
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While it is true [that] discrimination is hard to prove, it does not follow that it 
involves the question of subjective intent. You are confusing prejudice with 
discrimination. Prejudice, racial, religious or national is subjective, and 
involves intent. It is an emotion or feeling, a state or attitude of mind. It is an 
inner condition. Not so with discrimination. Discrimination, racial, religious 
or what not, is an objective practice, which can be seen, heard, and felt. . . . 
FEPC is not designed to abolish prejudice but to eliminate discrimination.120 
The purpose of the FEPC, then, according to Randolph, focused more on 
economic empowerment and participation than elimination of racial bias.121 
The broader group of FEPC supporters also focused on economic 
participation, not simply racial discrimination. As one commentator described 
it: 
The bloc was interracial, interfaith, and truly nationwide in scope. It targeted 
not just Jim Crow segregation in the South but also employment 
discrimination all across the country; not just discrimination against African 
Americans but also discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or 
national origin. The breadth of the bloc marked a substantial departure from 
racial politics in earlier years, when race advancement organizations were the 
primary lobbies, and when lynching and poll taxes topped their legislative 
agenda. . . . The politics of fair employment, by contrast, displayed national 
dimensions. After all, job discrimination was not only prevalent in the South; 
it was extensive throughout northern labor markets and implicated northern 
employers and their unions. Labor market discrimination also affected 
religious and ethnic minorities living in northern cities, not just African 
Americans in the South.122 
The fundamental principle underlying the FEPC and Title VII, then, is not just 
non-discrimination but full economic participation, unimpaired by 
discrimination.  
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. formed another important 
piece of the landscape developed at this time. In that case, the NAACP sued 
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers (the Brotherhood) 
which served as the exclusive bargaining representative between the railroad 
and the workers under the terms of the Railway Labor Act. At the time, the 
majority of railroad firemen were white, with a significant minority of 
African-Americans, all of whom the Brotherhood excluded from membership 
in the union. The NAACP brought suit when the Brotherhood sought to amend 
the collective bargaining agreement between the Brotherhood and the railroads 
“in such manner as ultimately to exclude all Negro firemen from the 
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service.”123 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found for the 
plaintiffs and found that the union had a duty “to represent non-union or 
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, 
impartially, and in good faith.”124 The Court stated the duty owed was: 
[A]t least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of 
the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal 
protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen 
fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those 
possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those 
whom it represents . . . .125 
The Court based its reasoning upon the fact that, as the exclusive 
representative for workers in negotiating the collective bargaining agreement, 
a union controls the economic opportunities available to workers.126 If the 
union is not required to represent all workers, “the minority would be left with 
no means of protecting [its] interests or, indeed, their right to earn a livelihood 
by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.”127 The Court stated 
that, while a union is free to make trade-offs that have unfavorable effects on 
some workers, the rationale for the differential treatment must be relevant to 
the job.128 It went on to state, “Here the discriminations based on race alone 
are obviously irrelevant and invidious.”129 Finally, it concluded that: 
 In the absence of any available administrative remedy, the right here 
asserted, to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty of the bargaining 
representative to represent and act for the members of a craft, is of judicial 
cognizance. That right would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without 
the remedy which courts can give for breach of such a duty or obligation and 
which it is their duty to give in cases in which they have jurisdiction.130 
Steele is significant, then, because it recognizes that the opportunity to 
meaningful economic participation cannot be abridged by the private actions 
of a union or employer on the basis of race discrimination. In a unanimous 
opinion, the Court essentially created a new cause of action in federal courts—
not specified in the language of either the National Labor Relations Act or the 
Railway Labor Act—allowing workers to bring suit when the union breached 
its duty of fair representation. It created a mechanism for enforcing an 
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affirmative right implied in the statutes, without which African-Americans and 
other workers would have been arbitrarily denied the right to work. 
Professor David Engstrom has argued that the choice of the FEPC model, 
a commission with authority to mediate disputes and issue cease-and-desist 
orders, also reflects the recognition that issues of class were at the heart of the 
civil rights movement.131 He argues that the FEPC model allowed both the 
civil rights movement and the labor movement “a measure of control over the 
pace and substance of racial change.”132 The CIO favored the FEPC because, 
as a group of industrial unions, it organized all workers, not just skilled 
trades.133 The FEPC made black workers in northern industries, such as auto, 
steel, and meat packing, a core part of its organizing effort even as it realized 
that there would be racial issues to address.134 According to Walter Reuther, 
president of the United Auto Workers, the FEPC model, based on conciliation 
and negotiation, would allow unions to navigate the difficulties of integrating 
unions in the 1940s.135 The FEPC would allow labor to “sweat this [race 
relations] thing out,” by providing time to figure out how to ensure the 
fundamental right of full economic participation to people of all races.136 
Civil rights groups, on the other hand, were focusing not just on 
challenging public, Jim Crow discrimination, but also exclusion from private 
labor markets.137 According to Engstrom, the FEPC allowed these groups to 
convince legislators and the public that its goal was to eliminate the public 
harm associated with private discrimination, rather than to compensate 
individuals.138 The NAACP argued that the FEPC model ensured the 
constitutionality of fair employment laws because the model was narrowly 
tailored to vindicate a public right because “[p]ublic welfare requires the 
elimination of discrimination, not the payment of damages.”139 Civil rights 
groups could convincingly argue that the FEPC created a new structure that 
was good for everyone because it ensured full economic participation and 
opportunity. It was not about rewarding a few plaintiffs with monetary 
damages but rather about guaranteeing the fundamental right to use one’s own 
labor to have meaningful economic opportunity. 
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d. The Legacy of the FEPC 
The FEPC provided the basis for Title VII in several other important ways. 
Following the dissolution of the FEPC by President Truman, various groups 
came together to pursue federal FEPC legislation. These groups included the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the United Auto Workers. These 
groups became instrumental in the inclusion of Title VII in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Furthermore, the FEPC set the agenda for how the country would 
think about civil rights and employment: as something the government should 
address as part of the New Deal regulatory model.140 
3. The Civil Rights Section of Roosevelt’s Justice Department 
The FEPC and its underlying principles have their origin in Roosevelt’s 
broader New Deal vision of meaningful economic opportunity. At the start of 
the twentieth century, African-Americans had made little progress in securing 
economic equality, even though organizations such as the NAACP and the 
National Urban League (founded in 1910 to secure more and better jobs) 
existed for this purpose.141 The ameliorative, concessionary approach taken by 
such groups during World War I had not been successful in achieving these 
goals.142 Following World War I, the African-American population found 
itself still subject to lynching, Jim Crow laws, peonage, and high 
unemployment.143 The National Urban League changed tactics, becoming 
more confrontational.144 In 1925, A. Philip Randolph founded the Brotherhood 
of Sleeping Car Porters, which quickly became the most powerful African-
American labor organization.145 The depression and its aftermath saw the 
emergence of wide-scale African-American campaigns, including the “buy-
where-you-can-work” movement, and increased African-American voting.146 
In the 1930s, Roosevelt, recognizing the importance of this emerging 
population, moved to include African-Americans in New Deal employment 
opportunities.147 By 1935, three million blacks (20% of the black labor force) 
were employed in New Deal relief projects.148  
In 1939, Attorney General Frank Murphy created the Civil Liberties Unit 
within the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice for the 
                                                                                                                     
 140 CHEN, supra note 67, at 33, 41–44. 
 141 See RUCHAMES, supra note 65, at 7–9; see also Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement 
History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 260–67 (2011). 
 142 RUCHAMES, supra note 65, at 8–9. 
 143 Id. at 9. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 10; see also Carle, supra note 141, at 270–75. 
 147 Loevy, supra note 114, at 12. 
 148 Id. 
1188 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
“aggressive protection of fundamental rights inherent in a free people.”149 
From the beginning, the Civil Liberties Unit focused on the protection of labor 
rights and economic security, viewing that as core to its mission.150 In its 
earliest days, it helped the United Mine Workers receive recognition as the 
union representative for coal miners in Harlan County, Kentucky, and 
protected labor and speech in New Jersey and California.151  
In 1941, the unit changed its name to the Civil Rights Section (CRS). The 
CRS began to focus more on protecting African-Americans by bringing cases 
addressing voting rights, lynching, police brutality, peonage, and involuntary 
servitude. By concentrating on the last two, the CRS found a way to meld its 
original labor focus with its new focus on civil rights. The peonage cases 
“offered the CRS a way to join labor and race rights, to protect African 
Americans in a politically palatable way, and to build on doctrinal 
strengths.”152 The peonage cases were politically palatable because the abuses 
were so egregious that even Southern whites were willing to condemn them. 
The CRS viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as an available doctrinal path to 
attack these problems because it had not been closed off by the courts like the 
Fourteenth Amendment.153 
Cases brought by the CRS typically involved agricultural workers in the 
South trapped in a variety of different, abusive labor relationships. As many 
African-Americans left the South to find employment in the North and other 
workers began to experience greater freedom, white farmers needed to find 
new ways to control African-American labor.154 They turned to methods such 
as share cropping, debt peonage, and violence to maintain an unfree work 
force.155 While illegal, whites were able to utilize these practices because of 
their complete control of the legal and political system in the South.156 As one 
academic summarized, “for the 29 percent of African Americans who stayed 
in the rural South as late as 1950, much remained the same seventy-five years 
after the end of chattel slavery.”157 The CRS responded to complaints from 
African-Americans who characterized this oppression as both racial and 
economic.158 African-Americans complained explicitly about violations under 
the Thirteenth Amendment,159 and complained of being held “under 
                                                                                                                     
 149 RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 111 (2007). 
 150 Id. at 116–17. 
 151 Id. at 118.  
 152 Id. at 124. 
 153 Id. at 112, 124, 129–38. 
 154 Id. at 55–60. 
 155 GOLUBOFF, supra note 149, at 60–66. 
 156 Id. at 57. 
 157 Id. at 52. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 130. 
2014] FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF TITLE VII 1189 
 
slavery.”160 A typical case from this period involved hundreds of young 
African-American workers held in peonage on Florida sugar plantations.161 
Over time, the CRS expanded its efforts beyond those held in debt 
peonage to other situations. In 1948, it helped pass an amendment to the Anti-
Peonage Act to facilitate this work.162 The amendment changed the terms of 
the statute to remove the phrase “slave trade” and include “involuntary 
servitude.”163 The purpose of this change was to “enable prosecutors to use a 
single statute to attack non-debt-based involuntary servitude.”164 Broadening 
the scope to involuntary servitude cases allowed the CRS to pursue more than 
traditional debt peonage cases.165 It eventually began to address cases that 
involved “virtual slavery,” featuring other types of coercion and oppressive 
conditions, as well as cases focusing on women in domestic work.166 
The choice of cases pursued by the CRS was linked institutionally to the 
FEPC, as well as to other federal New Deal agencies. The National Labor 
Relations Board and the War Labor Board covered African-American 
industrial workers but not those in agricultural or domestic work.167 The CRS 
also saw less need to focus on organized labor because employers were no 
longer as likely to engage in the types of criminal violence that initially drew 
its attention.168 Finally, the CRS believed that the FEPC provided some 
protection, even if inadequate, to industrial workers, while agricultural and 
domestic workers had none.169 
The work of the CRS relied explicitly on the Thirteenth Amendment while 
also evidencing the same fundamental, positive rights underlying the FEPC. 
[T]he CRS used the Thirteenth Amendment to extend to some of the most 
destitute black workers affirmative New Deal protections for personal 
security, labor rights, and rights to minimal economic security. . . . Its civil 
rights practice accepted an affirmative responsibility to challenge economic 
exploitation as well as racial discrimination.170 
By doing so, it sought to ensure that African-Americans controlled and 
could profit from their own labor.171 In 1947, Robert Carr, Executive 
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Secretary to President Truman’s 1946 Committee on Civil Rights, wrote a 
report on the work of the CRS.172 In it he observed that: 
[T]he CRS expanded the Thirteenth Amendment from focusing on individual 
employment relationships to mandating the elimination of legal obstacles to 
African American free labor writ large. The CRS lawyers used the Thirteenth 
Amendment to deepen what had been the New Deal’s equivocal commitment 
to free labor within a unified national economy.173 
African-Americans were forced to rely on the Thirteenth Amendment to 
secure these economic rights because they had been left out of many of the 
other New Deal statutes.174 The Thirteenth Amendment allowed the CRS to 
guarantee “a version of the economic rights to minimal living standards” that 
the New Deal statutes offered to industrial workers.175 The CRS wanted to 
make it clear that the Thirteenth Amendment serves “as a basis for a positive, 
comprehensive federal program—a program defining fundamental civil rights 
protected by federal machinery against both state and private 
encroachment.”176 Thus, the work of the CRS provides the link between Title 
VII, through the FEPC and other New Deal statutes, to the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  
4. The Thirteenth Amendment (1864) and the Anti-Peonage Act (1867) 
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.177 
Although the undoubted aim of the Amendment included the abolition of 
chattel slavery as it existed before the Civil War, it sought to accomplish much 
more than that. Fully studied and properly understood, the Amendment “is a 
positive guarantee against both race discrimination and the exploitation of 
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workers.”178 This understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, which became 
the basis for the work of the CRS during the New Deal and eventually formed 
the ideological basis for the work of the FEPC and Title VII, can be seen 
through the intent of the Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment, the passage of 
implementing legislation (the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867), and a pair of cases 
decided under that statute. According to this view, the Thirteenth Amendment 
incorporates “an anti-subordination model of equality, based not solely on 
equal treatment, but instead recognizing that both racial equality and economic 
rights are necessary for true equality.”179 
Professor Lea VanderVelde has undertaken detailed analysis of the 
legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment.180 In summarizing the 
overall intent of the Framers, she writes: 
The evidence suggests that the thirteenth amendment was animated by a 
conception of labor reform broader than the elimination of racial servitude 
which was its catalyst. By abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude, the 
framers of the thirteenth amendment sought to advance both a floor of 
minimum rights for all working men and an unobstructed sky of opportunities 
for their advancement. One of the primary principles that led the Radicals to 
oppose slavery was a desire to improve the condition of the working man. 
From this perspective, race slavery was objectionable not only for its 
pernicious racism, but also as the most obvious and brutal violation of the 
free labor principle. The thirteenth amendment was a milestone in the 
elimination of racial oppression, but it was also a milestone in the elimination 
of labor subjugation.181 
The Framers saw the link and sought to address the connection between 
“economic exploitation and race, and to establish the right to work free of 
economic exploitation.”182 In doing so, they recognized that the right to work 
for wages, free of coercion, and to engage in the economy were fundamental 
human rights, which must be available to all individuals.183 The institutions of 
slavery and involuntary servitude frustrated these objectives for both slaves 
and white workers with whom they competed. In abolishing these institutions, 
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the Thirteenth Amendment created a positive right to work under fair 
conditions.184 
This same legislative intent led to the passage of the Anti-Peonage Act a 
few years later.185 The statute prohibited peonage, defined as “the voluntary or 
involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt 
or obligation, or otherwise . . . .”186 The Act obviously reached beyond 
slavery, to include a variety of other abusive labor relationships, including 
those that had been entered into voluntarily.187 Sponsors of the bill favored 
this broad approach because voluntariness was not as important as “whether 
the resulting condition was degrading to workers and employers,” peonage 
was “very much like slavery,” and the abolition of peonage would elevate the 
status of all low wage workers (citing the rise in wages and improved work 
conditions for peons in New Mexico following the abolition of peonage 
there).188 This broad approach to the implementing statute reflected the 
government’s desire to provide affirmative protection and its free labor 
ideology, both of which were prevalent in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.189 In 
Clyatt v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the statute, emphasizing the 
broad power of Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment to reach private 
conduct because “the Thirteenth Amendment names no party or authority, but 
simply forbids slavery and involuntary servitude, [and] grants to Congress 
power to enforce this prohibition by appropriate legislation.”190 
Two cases illustrate the application of the statute and its relationship to 
this understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment. The first, Bailey v. Alabama, 
arose when Lonzo Bailey was convicted of fraud under an Alabama statute 
which made it a crime to enter into a contract for service, with intent to 
defraud the employer, by receiving money up front in exchange for service 
and then refusing to perform the service. Because refusal to perform the 
service (or refund the money) was prima facie evidence of intent to defraud, 
the debtor/employee had to work for the lender/employer until the debt was 
paid off or face criminal prosecution.191 Typically, the rate of pay was 
insufficient for the laborer to both live and save enough to pay off the debt, 
resulting in the choice of long-term compelled labor or being jailed.192 The 
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Supreme Court characterized this as involuntary servitude in violation of the 
Anti-Peonage Act because the state “may not compel one man to labor for 
another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a criminal if he does not 
perform the service or pay the debt.”193 
In its opinion, the Court emphasized the broad nature of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, stating: 
The plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and all 
its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of bondage; to make 
labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one 
man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which is the essence of 
involuntary servitude.194 
The Court explained the fundamental importance of the Amendment, saying 
that involuntary servitude is prohibited because “[t]here is no more important 
concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can enduring 
prosperity be based.”195 
In 1944, during the New Deal era, the United States Supreme Court 
decided the case of Emmanuel Pollock.196 In that case, the plaintiff borrowed 
$5 from his employer and agreed to work off the debt. He was convicted of 
fraud when he failed to perform his end of the bargain and was fined $20 for 
each dollar of debt. When he defaulted on the fine, the lower court required 
him to work off the $105 debt, at a rate of less than nine cents a day.197 The 
Supreme Court struck down the state statute, which criminalized fraud in 
relation to an employment contract that linked debt to service. In doing so, the 
Supreme Court clearly articulated the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
It said, “The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by 
the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system 
of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”198 The 
Court emphasized that free labor is essential because, without equal 
opportunity for all workers to quit and change employers, the working 
conditions for all workers will be depressed.199 In this view, equal opportunity 
and fair competition are essential for providing all workers with decent 
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working conditions. And it is the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution that creates this principle as central and fundamental to the U.S. 
legal system. 
C. The Human Rights Approach 
Thus far, this Article has shown how Title VII is properly understood as a 
statute that guarantees meaningful economic opportunity and participation by 
focusing on domestic law. International law also supports the argument that 
employment discrimination statutes are not mere torts. They occupy a special 
place in international law as human rights statutes. International law 
recognizes a hierarchy of laws, including two special types of law: jus cogens 
(often called peremptory norms) and customary international law. Of these, jus 
cogens is the most indelible; it exists apart from and does not depend on the 
consent of a state.200 In 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
defined jus cogens or a peremptory norm as “a norm accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.”201 Customary 
international law, on the other hand, depends upon long term, widespread legal 
recognition and compliance with a principle.202 Many of the principles defined 
as jus cogens or customary international law are principles that might also be 
termed “human rights.”203 In international law, rights or freedoms categorized 
as human rights enjoy “enhanced or special legal status and protection, over 
and above that provided by the ordinary domestic criminal or civil law.”204 
These three interrelated concepts (jus cogens, customary international law, and 
human rights) are all implicated in a discussion of the nature of employment 
discrimination laws. 
“Human rights” may be somewhat difficult to define and commentators 
might debate over what is included in that term, but human dignity serves as 
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the generally accepted organizing principle for human rights.205 In the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “dignity serves both to indicate the 
foundation of rights in the Universal Declaration (the status of equal and 
inherent human worth) and also to highlight some of the normative 
implications . . . .”206 Two possible sources for human rights exist: positive 
law (those rights enshrined within a legal system) and natural law.207 The 
latter source, grounded in ethics and morality, is said to exist independent of 
positive law and emanate from a higher order. Natural law is seen as “a 
universal and absolute set of principles governing all human beings in time 
and space.”208 Different ethical traditions likely disagree about the outer 
parameters of natural law, but human dignity “represents the intersection of a 
variety of different ethical traditions, each of which provides a distinct 
grounding for the human rights listed in the [Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and which] converge on a limited and general affirmation of the equal 
moral worth of all human persons.”209 Thus, human dignity, including equality 
and nondiscrimination in general, sits at the core of international human 
rights.210 
1. Employment Discrimination, Meaningful Economic Opportunity, and 
Human Rights 
Within international law, the right to be free from employment 
discrimination in order to have meaningful economic opportunity is rightfully 
considered a human right.211 Discrimination can be understood as a human 
rights violation because it singles out people based on a group characteristic 
that is typically core to a person’s identity (such as race or religion). In 
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addition, although discrimination is unrelated to the ability to perform a job, it 
ends up impacting economic equality, educational equality, and how groups 
are viewed by others. As the International Labor Organization observed: 
Very often those who suffer racial or ethnic discrimination are very poor. 
Centuries of unequal treatment in all spheres of life, combined with persistent 
and deep ethnic socio-economic inequalities, explain their low educational 
and occupational attainments. Lower achievements, in turn, make them 
vulnerable to ethnic stereotyping, while social and geographic segregation 
perpetuates ethnic inequalities, reinforcing perceptions of “inferiority” or 
“distastefulness” by majority groups.212 
The opportunities to be judged by one’s real abilities and to attain one’s full 
potential coincide with notions of human dignity and thus form the bases for 
this human right. 
Because of this, several treaties classify employment discrimination as a 
violation of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, states that 
discrimination constitutes a violation of human rights. In addition, the right to 
own your labor, in order to have meaningful economic opportunity, is also a 
human right. According to the Declaration of Philadelphia, which established 
the principles of the International Labor Organization, “all human beings, 
irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue . . . their material 
well-being . . . in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and 
equal opportunity.”213 In addition, the opposite of owning your own labor and 
being able to profit from it is akin to slavery, and the “right not to be a slave is 
the most basic of all human rights.”214 
2. Jus Cogens and Customary International Law 
Although there is not complete agreement on the list of jus cogens rights, 
all major commentators include a prohibition against slavery on the list.215 The 
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list also typically includes a prohibition on “racial discrimination.”216 Lists of 
customary international law, including the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, include a prohibition on slavery or slave 
trade, and either systemic racial discrimination,217 or the more general 
principle of non-discrimination.218 For the most part, jus cogens rights and 
customary international law norms reside in the treaties that protect them and 
the court decisions that implement them.219 In this way, international law 
norms include rights and principles that are given special treatment and are 
valued above regular civil and criminal law. These principles include the 
principles found in Title VII: nondiscrimination in employment and the right 
to meaningful economic participation. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR MIGRATION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN TORTS AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 
Title VII is not just a tort. It is a statute based on the principle that 
individuals have the right to own and use their own labor free of 
discrimination in order to have meaningful economic participation. It cannot 
be read or understood in isolation. It is part of the larger Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and has its origins in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude. It also fits within 
the international law framework, which views freedom from employment 
discrimination and the right to meaningful economic participation as a human 
right.  
This perspective on Title VII has two major implications in an analysis 
about the conflict and migration between torts and civil rights law. First, it 
provides reasons that the current Supreme Court’s tortification approach, 
including its textualist approach and doctrinal moves, is incorrect. Second, it 
suggests the possibility of migrating torts law into Title VII in a different 
way—one that recognizes the fundamental nature of Title VII. It suggests that 
Title VII creates not just a prohibition against discrimination but rather an 
affirmative duty for employers to provide a workplace with meaningful 
economic opportunity for all workers. 
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A. The Tortification Debate 
According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, super-statutes address particularly 
vexing social or economic problems for which there has been a lengthy 
normative debate and create a new normative or institutional framework that 
“sticks” in public culture.220 The Supreme Court’s tortification of Title VII 
may have occurred because the problem of employment discrimination is 
indeed vexing, and the majority of the current Court may not like the 
normative framework established by Title VII, even though it has indeed 
“stuck” in popular opinion. Tortification provides an oblique way for the Court 
to cut back on Title VII’s protection without directly admitting that it is doing 
so. The fact that there is so much resistance to tortification is not surprising, 
given that Title VII reflects principles found in our Constitution and in 
international human rights norms. The fundamental nature of Title VII 
provides some specific reasons why the Court’s textualist approach and 
doctrinal moves are incorrect. 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
Considering Title VII’s fundamental nature provides insight into how Title 
VII should be interpreted. Under the elements approach, Title VII cannot be 
interpreted independently of the rest of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other 
contemporaneous statutes and the social situation at the time. Early, seminal 
cases decided under Title VII, such as Griggs v. Duke Power—which 
established disparate impact—might well have been decided differently under 
a textualist approach. The outcome in Griggs, as well as other structural 
discrimination cases, rests on finding discrimination based on a “mix of 
intentional, negligent, and unconscious motives and actions.”221 In order to 
reach the conclusion, there had to be a “dialogue about the purposes of 
employment discrimination law, how protected traits limit people within 
modern workplaces, or whether Congress meant to reach these types of 
claims.”222 This dialogue situates employment discrimination within the larger 
context of societal discrimination and the fight for full social equality, rather 
than in a debate about the dictionary meaning of certain words. Such an 
outcome is justified given the context of Title VII as just one element in the 
Civil Rights Act and the historical background leading to its passage. 
According to Eskridge and Ferejohn’s descriptive theory, super-statutes 
are generally construed liberally and purposefully in order to give effect to 
their underlying foundational principles.223 A narrow, textualist approach that 
limits the purpose of the statute misunderstands the importance of the issue 
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addressed in a super-statute and the manner in which Congress has 
incorporated the will of the governed in passing the statute. Building on this 
work, Eskridge and Ferejohn moved from a descriptive theory of super-
statutes to a normative theory of constitutional law called “A Republic of 
Statutes.” Under this theory, certain statutes should be recognized as 
transforming constitutional baselines and creating new governance structures 
and norms, such that they guide the evolution of constitutional law.224 They 
recognize the Civil Rights Act as one of these statutes. Given the quasi-
Constitutional or small “c” constitutional nature of the Civil Rights Act, it 
deserves a broad interpretation, not a narrow, textualist one. 
Applying this analysis to Title VII, any interpretation of Title VII must 
facilitate the principle of full economic participation, free of discrimination, 
found in the Thirteenth Amendment. Its interpretation must not be constrained 
by reference to definitions found in dictionaries or tort treatises when these 
interpretive moves serve to frustrate Title VII’s fundamental nature. When 
looking at how to interpret the specific language of Title VII, general 
principles of equality and participation, not narrow principles of tort law, must 
be the guiding force. 
Finally, an international law, human rights approach to Title VII also 
shows the problems of a narrow, textualist approach to the statute. In general, 
human rights are special and universal; they may not be abandoned or ignored 
by a state. Under the doctrine of jus cogens, certain rights, such as the rights to 
be free of racial discrimination, may not be derogated by judicial interpretation 
unless they are replaced with adequate protection. To the extent these rights 
are covered in a treaty or a convention, such as the prohibition on employment 
discrimination, a state may not interpret a statute to evade enforcement of the 
treaty.225 Finally, even in the absence of a treaty, violations of human rights 
principles recognized as customary international law, such as racial 
discrimination, are said to violate international law.226 When the Supreme 
Court takes a narrow, textualist view of Title VII, ignores its nature as a 
human rights statute, interprets the statute as a tort, and then uses narrowly 
constructed tort principles to foreclose protection from employment 
discrimination, the Court’s approach runs contrary to international human 
rights principles. 
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2. Title VII’s Doctrinal Issues 
Given Title VII’s fundamental nature and underlying purpose, the 
doctrinal moves made by the Supreme Court are also problematic. In 
interpreting the prohibition not to “discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin,”227 the Supreme Court imported “intent” and “cause,” as these 
terms are understood in tort doctrine, into the “because of” language for 
certain claims. Neither of these moves fit the fundamental nature of Title VII.  
 In looking at intent, the Supreme Court has read both a requirement of 
motive or bias and a showing of tort-type intent (desiring an outcome or acting 
with knowledge that the outcome is likely to occur) into intentional 
discrimination claims. The Court has done this as a way to require that an 
adverse employment practice was done because of discrimination. Although 
motive or bias may be part of the requirement, there is no need to additionally 
require intent in terms of desiring an outcome or acting with knowledge that 
the outcome is likely to occur. Cat’s paw and other cases will be incorrectly 
screened out by this requirement. In Staub, the plaintiff experienced an 
economic loss because of the racial animus of the supervisor charged with 
giving the evaluation, even if the employer who acted upon the evaluation did 
not intend to discriminate against Staub.228 
At a more basic level, the intent requirement misunderstands Title VII’s 
fundamental nature because it views discrimination as the discrete, willful act 
of a particular individual rather than an economic effect or outcome 
experienced by a worker. As A. Philip Randolph said over fifty years ago, the 
statute seeks to eliminate discrimination when it occurs.229 It does not matter if 
the employer intended it to occur or whether the plaintiff can show that intent. 
It only matters that it happened. The requirement of motive or bias ensures that 
the discrimination is because of a prohibited reason. The statute requires no 
more than that.  
In addition, the Supreme Court requirement that “because of” means “but 
for” also runs counter to the fundamental purpose of Title VII. As the history 
of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shows, employment 
discrimination is multi-faceted and complex. To require a plaintiff to prove 
that race was the but-for cause of the adverse employment actions means that 
only the most obvious types of discrimination will be able to be proved. 
Mixed-motive cases, in which other factors also influenced the outcome, may 
be screened out. This requirement will not allow for the ability of all 
employees to have full, meaningful economic participation because 
discriminatory road blocks will be excused if they were a cause, but not the 
but-for cause. 
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Finally, the newly added requirement of proximate cause is also 
unnecessarily limiting. Proximate cause is defined as the subset of actions for 
which there is cause-in-fact and when the Court finds that it is fair to hold the 
defendant responsible. It is essentially a double check, a balancing of politics 
and policy, to make sure that the defendant should be held liable. The 
balancing of politics and policy in the area of employment discrimination is 
particularly complex and dependent upon a variety of factors. When passing 
Title VII, Congress performed this balance and did so by drawing upon the 
history of regulating discrimination in employment and lessons learned under 
the FEPC and in the context of the rest of the Civil Rights Act. It set up an 
elaborate framework including administrative processes, statutory defenses, as 
well as exclusions and proof structures meant to balance the interests of 
employers, employees and society. There is no need for courts to add an 
additional check, especially if the check is done based on torts doctrine. If 
courts do so, they run the risk of misinterpreting and incorrectly limiting Title 
VII. 
3. A Better Approach 
Title VII’s fundamental nature suggests a better approach to dealing with 
doctrinal and interpretive issues than the tortification approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court. “Discrimination because of race” should be viewed as a single 
operative phrase and not be parsed into tort based elements. In addition, the 
phrase should be read broadly and contextually, not literally. This approach 
would shape discrimination discourse in three ways. Significantly, it shifts the 
focus away from a requirement to identify a bad actor with discriminatory 
intent and instead looks at the obstacles to full economic participation in the 
workplace. 
First, courts would be free to focus on and accept proof of structural or 
systemic discrimination. This interpretation would allow for the introduction 
of cognitive bias theories and similar evidence explaining the ways in which 
“discrimination because of race,” “discrimination because of sex,” etc. deny 
full economic participation of protected groups in the contemporary 
workplace. This approach fits with the contextual or elements approach to 
interpreting Title VII, as well as the super-statute approach, because it 
recognizes the ways in which society currently orders opportunities for 
economic participation. Rather than focusing on discrete acts of the employer, 
it would require courts to examine systemic practices that deny full economic 
participation. 
Second, this approach would embrace and expand upon current disparate 
impact analysis because it recognizes that discrimination can be experienced 
as a practice or effect, not just as the result of an intentional act. Because this 
approach looks to the larger social context of economic opportunity, it is not 
constrained by a requirement to be “color-blind” when evaluating the 
construction of the employer’s policy. As a result, it would evaluate 
1202 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:6 
 
affirmative action policies on whether they ensure equal economic 
opportunity, rather than focusing on whether they are facially neutral.  
Finally, it would provide an approach to reach the myriad of ways in 
which full economic participation is hampered because of race in conjunction 
with other factors. Mixed-motive cases would recognize that the presence of 
racial discrimination should equate with an actionable discrimination claim, 
even if other factors also contributed to the adverse employment action. This 
analysis respects the complexity of how discrimination operates in American 
society. 
B. Migration of Tort Law into Title VII: Creating an Affirmative Duty 
The Supreme Court’s tortification moves, described above, focus on 
discrete doctrinal elements of torts (intent and causation). For the reasons 
described above, those moves run contrary to the fundamental nature of Title 
VII. A different type of tortification could be imagined, though, which 
embraces the fundamental nature of Title VII and its underlying principles. 
Using this approach, Title VII would be seen as creating an affirmative duty to 
have a workplace that provides meaningful economic opportunity. Creating 
this affirmative duty would ensure that Title VII worked as a class-based 
statute, as well as a civil rights statue, a result consistent with the fundamental 
nature of Title VII. 
Torts law is a broad field, with arguably few consistent principles.230 A 
traditional view of torts, though, could be said to encompass three types of 
torts: strict liability; intentional torts; and negligence.231 While it may be 
somewhat difficult to fully “map” the traditional Title VII causes of action 
onto these types of torts,232 this section examines the possibility of tortifying 
Title VII with one concept central to the tort of negligence: duty. Negligence is 
the failure to meet a duty of care. For a plaintiff to prevail, she must establish 
that the defendant owed her a duty and that the defendant breached the duty. 
To complete the tort of negligence, the plaintiff must also prove that the 
breach caused an injury (proving both cause-in-fact and proximate cause) and 
establish damages.  
The duty of care in the tort of negligence varies depending upon a number 
of factors. The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant can affect the 
duty owed. For example, a land owner owes a different duty of care to a 
trespasser than to a paying customer. The status of the defendant can also 
change the duty owed. For example, a common carrier, such as a bus 
company, likely owes a higher duty of care to a passenger than an individual 
does when driving a friend to the same destination. The duty of care can also 
turn on the type of negligence alleged. For example, the duty owed in a 
                                                                                                                     
 230 Sperino, Tort, supra note 22, at 1082–83. 
 231 Id. at 1072. 
 232 Id. at 1073–74. 
2014] FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF TITLE VII 1203 
 
medical malpractice case is set to that of a reasonable doctor, not a reasonable 
person. 
If the Court decided to treat Title VII like a negligence tort, what might the 
duty of care look like?233 The duty could be to “not discriminate.” Such a 
duty, though, would likely not integrate the fundamental principles embodied 
in Title VII because it does not define “discriminate.” To a large extent, the 
problems with the Court’s tortification cases come about from the way the 
Court applies tort principles of intent and cause when trying to determine if 
discrimination occurred. In addition, this duty does not track the specific 
constitutional and human rights principles found in Title VII. 
A better approach would be to base the duty owed under Title VII on the 
fundamental principle underlying Title VII—individuals have a right to own 
and use their own labor free of discrimination in order to have meaningful 
economic opportunity. Creating this affirmative duty fits with the New Deal 
origins of Title VII. As part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt declared a 
Second Bill of Rights in which he argued that “the state has an affirmative 
obligation to create conditions for individual flourishing, which is a 
precondition for the operation of a robust democracy that meets the needs of 
all relevant groups in our society.”234 His programs relied on the government 
providing affirmative protection of rights, rather than on protecting individuals 
from actions of the government. The program essentially established 
affirmative duties that would be protected by the government. The FEPC 
choice also focused on creating workplaces where all employees have a right 
to meaningful economic opportunity, rather than a model providing for 
individual damages.235 Finally, Steele talked explicitly about creating a duty of 
fair and meaningful opportunity that cannot be breached by a union 
discriminating on the basis of race. If Title VII is a tort, the duty is for 
employers to provide the opportunity for meaningful economic opportunity.  
This affirmative duty also fits with Title VII’s origins in the Thirteenth 
Amendment because the Amendment both creates and authorizes the creation 
of affirmative duties. Section 1 of the Amendment stating that “‘neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist’ is a positive guarantee against 
both race discrimination and exploitation of workers.”236 As Todd A. Rakoff 
suggested, the anti-slavery norm could be viewed as: 
Embodying a more positive freedom, as encapsulating a human power to start 
life afresh. What is essentially wrong with slavery, on this view, is its 
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immutable categorization of people and its concomitant denial of opportunity. 
Or, to bring the matter closer to the modern workplace, on this view the point 
of quitting is not just to get out from under bad circumstances. The point is to 
begin something new, to make something more of oneself. Quitting one’s job, 
rightly seen, is not a negative act; it is the first step in pursuing an affirmative 
and culturally valued course of conduct.237 
Professor James Gray Pope calls this positive rights approach to the 
Thirteenth Amendment the “free labor approach” because it focuses on the 
way in which the free labor system (the right to quit and to find other 
employment) operates in opposition to slavery and involuntary servitude.238 
This vision is one of opportunity and meaningful participation. As he 
summarizes, “the free labor approach centers on the creation and sustenance of 
an alternative to slavery; workers must enjoy not only the right to walk away 
from their employers, but also all rights that are essential to participation in the 
free labor system.”239 
Section 2 of the Amendment gives Congress authority to enforce the 
Amendment with legislation by creating positive rights and duties. As one 
sponsor of the Amendment stated about Section 2, “Congress shall have power 
to secure the rights of freemen to those men who had been slaves.”240 In 
describing the duty flowing from Thirteenth Amendment, the Framers 
“believed that the right to engage in the economy was a fundamental human 
right.”241 Creating a duty to provide a workplace where there is meaningful 
economic opportunity furthers these principles.  
International law principles also support an affirmative duty. This duty 
arises from either obligations placed on the state or obligations placed on 
private parties. In looking at obligations imposed on the state, some treaties 
contain negative obligations prohibiting the state from interfering with the 
exercise of rights. Others place positive obligations on the state requiring it to 
take affirmative steps to protect certain rights.242 The American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) Article 1 provides the positive requirement for state 
actors to set up a system to protect human rights violations.243 The Inter-
American Commission, the tribunal that enforces this Convention, has held 
that governments have a duty to respect, protect, ensure, and promote the 
rights. The duty to promote is a positive obligation that includes “a duty to 
foster conditions such that the individual may access and benefit from the 
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right.”244 Creating a tort duty, then, to allow for meaningful economic 
opportunity, free of discrimination, fits neatly within the obligations under 
international human rights law. 
One complication with the above analysis arises regarding the question of 
whether private parties can have an affirmative duty under international human 
rights law. For many years, the prevailing rule was that human rights law only 
created duties for state actors.245 The major exception to this rule has been the 
prohibition against slavery which creates a duty on individuals with regard to 
their conduct.246 This approach to slavery mirrors the unique nature of the 
Thirteenth Amendment in United States constitutional law as a part of the 
Constitution that creates positive rights against private conduct.247 Recently, 
commentators and activists have begun to question the traditional rule and 
argue that private actors must also necessarily be covered by international 
human rights guarantees.248 Although this principle is not yet firmly 
established in international law, given the connection between the abolition of 
slavery and the duty to provide meaningful economic opportunity, this duty is 
a sensible next step in applying human rights obligations to private parties. 
If Title VII was read as a tort, the prohibition against discrimination could 
be read as an affirmative guarantee of equality of economic opportunity. That 
guarantee would be informed by the context of the statute—both the other 
elements of the Civil Rights Act and the international understanding of the 
fundamental nature of nondiscrimination. It would also be informed by the 
origins of Title VII in the FEPC, the work of the CRS, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment. The proper duty owed by employers would be to provide a 
workplace where all employees have a right to meaningful economic 
opportunity. This duty would focus on both class and race, just as the Framers 
of the Thirteenth Amendment envisioned. 
V. CONCLUSION 
First year law students learn that the law of torts is used to compensate 
individuals for personal injuries, caused intentionally or negligently by others 
(or occasionally on the basis of strict liability). Typical torts cases involve 
physical injuries caused by automobile accidents, medical malpractice, or a 
defective product, although some torts involve injuries to personal dignity, 
reputation, or property. The purpose of the tort system is to compensate 
deserving plaintiffs and also to deter certain types of behavior. At common 
law, no tort exists for injuries caused by discrimination, although some 
employment discrimination plaintiffs allege negligent or intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress. Depending upon the situation, victims of sexual 
harassment sometimes bring claims for assault, battery, or wrongful 
imprisonment. These tort claims, however, are not the gravamen of the 
employment discrimination complaint. 
Perhaps this is because the tort system is not set up to remedy the type of 
injury suffered by a discrimination plaintiff and is not well-suited to deter 
discriminatory conduct. Discrimination in employment, especially when that 
discrimination is based on race, has a long, complex history in the United 
States. In many ways, its roots go back to the institution of slavery in the 
American South, an institution linked to both class and race. When Congress 
abolished slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment, it set about to establish a 
system of free labor in the United States. Ideally, all individuals would own 
their labor and have the opportunity for meaningful economic participation in 
the American economy. 
The reality of American society made it difficult for that goal to be 
obtained. Over the next 150 years, civil rights groups, labor groups, and the 
government worked slowly, haltingly to attain that goal. They used statutes 
and litigation through the early part of the twentieth century, followed by more 
litigation and a new administrative framework during Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
These efforts eventually lead to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. Its provisions reflected the resolution of the century long debate over 
how to guarantee meaningful economic opportunity, free of discrimination for 
African-Americans. Our debate and the development of our law were mirrored 
by debate and development in international law of ways to provide for free 
labor and nondiscrimination around the world, resulting in the development of 
human rights protection for these principles. 
Title VII, then, is not a tort. It is a statute embodying a basic and 
irrevocable principle—the principle that an individual not only owns her own 
labor but also has the opportunity to use that labor through meaningful 
economic participation, free of discrimination. Moves by the U.S. Supreme 
Court to treat Title VII as a mere tort and to limit its protection by adding tort 
requirements of intent and causation and by giving the statute a narrow, 
textualist interpretation frustrate the statute’s basic principle. 
If tort law must be imported into Title VII, a better approach is to borrow 
the concept of duty. Title VII could be said to create an affirmative duty on 
employers to provide a workplace where all individuals have the opportunity 
for meaningful economic participation. This concept of duty fits well with the 
elements approach, the super-statute approach, and the international human 
rights approach to understanding Title VII’s fundamental nature. Each of these 
approaches incorporates the idea of the government creating affirmative duties 
to protect full participation and meaningful economic opportunity. Such a duty 
could be the next step toward the elimination of economic slavery. 
 
